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Living Wage Laws: How Much Do (Can) They Matter?
*
 
In this paper I review what we have learned about living wage laws and their impacts on the 
wages, employment and poverty rates of low-wage workers. I review the characteristics of 
these laws and where they have been implemented to date, and what economic theory tells 
us about their likely effects in more and less competitive labor markets. I then review two 
bodies of empirical evidence: 1) Studies across cities or metropolitan areas that have and 
have not implemented these laws, using data from the Current Population Survey pooled 
over many years; and 2) Studies within particular cities, based on comparisons of covered 
and uncovered workers before and after the laws are passed. I conclude that living wage 
laws have modestly raised wage levels of low wage workers and have reduced their 
employment at covered firms, but that the magnitudes of both effects are likely quite small, 
given how few workers are usually covered by these ordinances. 
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research assistance. I also benefited from helpful comments made by Doug Wissoker, Howard Wial 
and other conference participants. I.  Introduction 
 
Living wage laws are “…local ordinances requiring private businesses that benefit 
from public money” to pay above-market wages and benefits to their workers (Living 
Wage Resource Center, 2006). These laws have been passed and implemented in many 
larger and smaller cities nationwide. They are widely viewed as efforts to aid the working 
poor and address labor market inequality, particularly as other institutions that have 
traditionally done so (such as minimum wage laws and collective bargaining) have 
eroded over time. 
But how effective are these laws at helping the working poor? Do they have 
unintended, and perhaps negative, consequences for these same groups – such as a drop 
in their employment rates? Do they affect enough workers to matter one way or another? 
And, if not, could they potentially be more effective than they are to date? 
In this paper we explore this set of issues. I begin by reviewing some facts about 
living wage laws – such as where and how they’ve been implemented, whom they cover, 
etc. I also outline their potential impacts, both positive and negative, on employment and 
other urban outcomes. Then I review the empirical literature on the impacts of living 







  2II. Living Wage Laws: Some Facts and Some Issues  
A.  The Facts 
Campaigns to pass “living wage” ordinances have become increasingly frequent 
in American cities during the past two decades. In addition to the basic goal of trying to 
raise wages among low earners, the organizers and sponsors of these campaigns have 
often had other goals in mind as well – such as preventing the outsourcing of municipal 
work to lower-wage providers, supporting union organizing, limiting the use of  
economic development subsidies by local governments to attract large firms, mobilizing a 
broader social movement to combat low wages and inequality, and even making a 
symbolic statement about fair wage levels and the appropriateness of government efforts 
to raise low wages. These efforts began to grow in a context of dramatically widening 
income inequality in the U.S., at a time when other policies and institutions that had 
traditionally been used in efforts to limit such inequality – such as minimum wage laws 
and unions – have been used less aggressively and are becoming scarcer in the private 
sector.
1      
The first “living wage” law in a major U.S. city was passed in Baltimore in 1994. 
As of May 2006, about140 cities and counties around the country had implemented them 
– including such large cities as Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, 
Milwaukee, and San Francisco (Living Wage Resource Center, op. cit.). A list of these 
cities and the characteristics of the laws passed there appears in Table 1. Campaigns to 
introduce new ordinances are underway in dozens more cities, usually under the active 
                                                 
1 Until the most recent round of increases in the federal minimum wage that were implemented in 2007, the 
statutory minimum had fallen to only about 30 percent of the mean wage in the private sector – its lowest 
level in five decades. The fraction of private sector workers organized into unions, at under 8 percent, has 
also fallen to a 50-year low. See Mishel et al. (2006).   
  3leadership of the community organizing group known as ACORN and involving local 
labor and religious organizations, among others.
2  
In general, these laws apply to the employees of private firms in one or both of 
the following categories: 1) Those that have service contracts with the city or county with 
dollar values above some defined minimum level; and/or 2) Those that receive other 
kinds of financial assistance from the municipal government, in the form of grants, loans, 
tax abatements, bond financing, and other forms of local economic development policies. 
In some limited cases, workers at publicly-owned but privately operated facilities (like 
airports or marinas) are also covered.     
These firms are required to pay their workers wages well above those specified by 
federal or state minimum wage laws.
3 The wage levels are usually set with the goal of 
lifting the incomes of year-round full-time workers above the official federal poverty line 
for a family of four; since the poverty line is now at about $21,000 per year, this requires 
an hourly wage of $10-11 per hour, which is a bit below the average wage mandated in 
these laws.
4 Though only a few such laws require that health or other benefits be 
provided to all workers in these firms, many stipulate a somewhat lower mandated wage 
level when such benefits are provided and a higher one when they are not.      
                                                 
2 The acronym “ACORN” stands for the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now.  
3 The federal minimum wage is $5.85 (as of May 2008) and is scheduled to rise to 6.25 in July 2008 and 
7.25 in July 2009. Nearly thirty states currently have minimum wage laws exceeding the federal level 
(Economic Policy Institute, 2007).   
4 Some cities instead use the poverty rate for a family of three, at roughly $17,000, as a guideline in setting 
their required wage levels. The official poverty lines rise annually with the rate of inflation (as measured by 
the Consumer Price Index), though the locally required wages do not always rise as well. But comparisons 
of annual incomes based on year-round full-time work at these wage levels with poverty rates assume only 
one worker per household and no other income supplements, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, which 
is available to low-income workers with children. For a discussion of the limits of the current poverty 
measures see Blank (2008).  
  4Despite these generally shared characteristics, and in addition to differences in the 
mandated wage and benefit levels specified, living wage laws vary substantially across 
local jurisdictions, as Table 1 also implies. For instance, the scope of coverage varies 
quite a bit even within the categories of firms defined above – with some laws applying 
only to full-time workers or limited to specific occupational categories. The 
administrative apparatus for implementing these laws varies as well across local areas, 
with some localities hiring officials explicitly to enforce these laws and making them 
quite accessible to the public while others do not (Luce, 2004). The geographic scope of 
coverage also varies, as some laws apply to municipalities and others to counties; and, 
even in the case of the former, some cities face a situation where similar laws are being 
implemented in contiguous municipalities while many others do not. Finally, some laws 
also contain provisions that require workers to be hired that live in the covered 
communities, and some are explicitly superseded by collective bargaining provisions 
while others are not. All of these characteristics of the policy context and how the laws 
are designed and implemented will likely affect their impacts on labor market outcomes.     
One other characteristic seems to apply almost universally in these efforts: local 
living wage ordinances generally seem to directly affect very few workers. Most studies 
imply that, even among workers in the bottom decile of wage levels, only 2-3% are 
covered by these laws (e.g., Fairris and Reich, 2005), as so few work for firms that 
benefit from local service contracts or other forms of public financial assistance; and, 
even in larger cities, the absolute numbers of workers covered will be very modest. For 
example, consider a city with a total population of 1 million, half of whom are in the 
  5workforce.
5 Of the 50,000 workers in the bottom decile of earnings, if 3% are directly 
covered by living wage ordinances, then only 1500 workers are so affected. In smaller 
cities, proportionately fewer workers will be affected.       
It is possible that higher wages in these firms “spill over” onto firms with whom 
they must compete in local markets, whether in the same or other geographic 
jurisdictions. It is also possible that these laws could be implemented in other ways that 
expand their reach. But, at the moment, it is important to recognize the relatively limited 
scope and impacts of existing laws, as we consider their actual or potential economic 
effects. 
B.  The Issues 
Since “living wage” ordinances mandate the payment of higher wages and 
benefits to workers than might be generated by the labor market, their effects are likely 
similar to those of minimum wage laws – though the “living wage” ordinances provide 
substantially higher wages and/or benefits for a much smaller range of workers. 
The general concern that economists have about any attempt by government to 
mandate higher wage payments by private employers is that it might result in lower 
employment levels. The analysis is based on the notion that employer hiring behavior is 
reflected in a “demand function” or a “demand curve” – in which, all else equal, they will 
hire fewer workers if they are forced to pay more for each of them.     
The expected impact of “living wage” ordinances is depicted in Figure 1. The 
figure shows the impact of living wage laws, as a type of “wage floor,” on the wages and 
employment levels (measured on the vertical and horizontal axes respectively) of covered 
                                                 
5 On average, only about three-fourths of the U.S. population falls between the ages of 16 and 64, and labor 
force participation rates for them generally average 60-70%. 
  6workers, relative to what might be generated in a “competitive equilibrium” in the labor 
market. As indicated, economists generally expect that any wage floor will generate a 




F), with wages above the market 
level (WF > W*) and employment below it (L
D
F < L*).  
But, since this floor will generally cover only a small number of firms in the labor 
market, any surplus of workers in the covered sector might well shift to the uncovered 
sectors of the economy – perhaps gaining employment there by driving down wages in 
the latter.
6 This implies that the wage gains of some workers might be offset by wage 
losses among others, though initial employment losses might be offset as well – making it 
harder to detect impacts on labor market outcomes either way. But, if market rigidities 
(such as minimum wage laws) make it difficult for the uncovered sectors to absorb the 
surplus workers, the positive effects on wages and negative effects on employment levels 
for the covered workers are more likely to be observed in the market overall.   
The magnitude of these effects (for any given level of mandated wages and 
coverage) will also be determined primarily by the “elasticity of labor demand” in the 
covered sector, which measures the degree to which employer demand for (or hiring of) 
workers responds to market wages. The more elastic (or flatter) this curve, the greater the 
responsiveness of employers to wages and the greater the potential negative effect of 
higher mandated wages on employment levels.  
This elasticity, in turn, will be affected by a few characteristics of this labor 
market. For one thing, firms that supply services to government agencies operate in less 
                                                 
6 The extra jobs in the uncovered sectors are generated because wages are reduced in those sectors to 
accommodate the workers who move there after losing their jobs in the covered sector and create enough 
extra jobs to employ them. These are known as “general equilibrium” effects in the labor market – see, for 
example, Mincer (1976) and Johnson and Mieszkowski (1970).   
  7competitive “product markets” than most other firms, since public agencies face less 
competition for the services they provide than does the private sector (e.g., Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 200 ). All else equal, less competitive product markets generate lower elasticities 
of labor demand, because it easier for firms to raise prices to cover the higher wages they 
pay without reducing product demand and employment. Whether this is also true of firms 
receiving financial assistance from these cities is less clear a priori; and whether or how 
most cities can easily absorb the higher costs associated with such labor, in an era of 
widespread fiscal tightness, is less clear as well.  
The size of the jurisdiction covered by these laws could also affect labor demand 
elasticities. All else equal, firms in larger covered geographic jurisdictions or in those 
where contiguous municipalities are also covered by similar laws will likely face less 
competition from other (uncovered) firms than those in smaller areas with fewer covered 
neighbors, thereby making it easier for the former to raise wages without generating 
employment losses or displacements. Covered firms might themselves have less incentive 
to relocate geographically to avoid the higher mandated costs of labor under these 
circumstances as well.
7  
This, of course, raises the possibility that the laws passed in any particular 
jurisdiction might create geographic spillovers onto other local areas. If the employers 
directly affected by these laws choose to relocate, this might benefit workers in the 
uncovered areas (by generating more jobs nearby for them and maybe raising local “wage 
norms” there) while disadvantaging workers somewhat in the covered area – who now 
might also face longer commutes to avoid job loss.  
                                                 
7 This discussion assumes that the covered employers are all located nearby in the same geographic area. 
For firms with municipal contracts, that might not actually be the case. 
  8Also, the higher wages at these firms might also generate some positive effects on 
their retention rates and job performance of their workers, and perhaps even in their 
skills, as workers with more ability might now apply for these jobs and try harder to keep 
them after being hired. These effects are associated with the notion of “efficiency wages” 
in the economics literature (Katz, 1986); they suggest that sometimes it is in the interest 
of employers to pay above-market wages, since the quality of the workers whom they 
hire and retain might fully or partially offset their higher costs. They also imply that 
demand for some groups of slightly more-skilled workers might actually rise over time, 
even while those of the least skilled decline. 
All else equal, the effects of higher wages on firm costs (and therefore on product 
prices and employment levels) will also be higher, the greater is the labor-intensity of the 
production process for the firm’s goods or services; and most services provided by 
municipal contractors are likely quite labor-intensive. On the other hand, if the numbers 
of workers at these firms affected are relatively small in comparison to their overall 
workforces, the effects of the mandate might not be very large, even on the quantities and 
prices of services provided. Indeed, Pollin and Luce (1998) argue that living wages in 
Los Angeles have raised operating costs for contractors by 1-2% and costs to the city by 
less than 1%.  
A few other caveats should be noted that might further reduce the likelihood of 
adverse employment effects associated with “living wage” ordinances. For one thing, 
other imperfections, such as limited market competition, might render the analysis above 
less valid and concerns about job losses less pressing.
8 If these laws are passed in strong 
                                                 
8 If, for instance, the labor market is characterized by “monopsony” – in which employers face very little 
competition for the workers whom they hire – the market forces generate wages below the competitive 
  9labor markets where job growth has been robust, any fears regarding job loss might also 
be less of a concern, as job availability might still be ample to provide jobs to most or all 
who seek them.
9 And even the notion of a well-defined “demand curve” might be 
challenged, since local governments and voters must make choices without any real 
information about how employers will actually respond to higher mandated wages – 
though the latter will no doubt plead hardship and predict reduced hiring during any such 
campaign.
10 In this case, the nature of the interaction between public and private actors is 
more uncertain than the analysis above would indicate.     
Finally, the effects of living wage ordinances might also go beyond the labor 
market outcomes considered above. For example, if higher mandated wages do generate 
higher costs and prices at contractor firms, city services might be reduced or taxes might 
have to rise to offset the higher costs. These developments, in turn, might 
disproportionately hurt lower-income residents of cities who are relatively more 
dependent on these services than are other residents. But if there is already some “slack” 
in city budgets, or if the magnitudes of services affected by these higher costs are small, 
any impacts on the costs or availability of services in urban areas will be mitigated.          
  In sum, the mandating of higher wages in a very limited sector of the local 
workforce might reduce employment there, but the magnitudes of these effects will 
                                                                                                                                                 
level, and a government wage mandate could actually raise employment levels as well as wages (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, op. cit.). But whether the labor markets in question might really be characterized by monopsony 
power is quite doubtful, in my view.     
9 Even in these cases, there might be job losses relative to what might exist in the absence of the “living 
wage” ordinance, but the employment prospects of low wage workers might not be negatively affected, as 
the losses are fully offset by other sources of job growth. As an example, when the federal minimum wage 
was raised in 1996-97, job growth in U.S. labor markets at that time seemed sufficiently strong to offset 
any losses that might otherwise have been observed.    
10 Economists might characterize this situation as one of “asymmetric information,” in which employers 
know how they intend to respond to the passage of prospective “living wage” ordinances, but the public 
does not and can only speculate about that. 
  10depend on a variety of market factors and might well be offset by a variety of forces in 
that market.  
 
III. Empirical Evidence on Effects of Living Wage Laws  
How do we infer the effects of “living wage” laws on outcomes such as wages 
and employment, and also on family incomes and poverty rates? The empirical literature 
can be largely divided into two categories: A) Studies of differences across cities that 
have or have not implemented these laws: and B) Studies within cities that compare firms 
and workers covered with those that are not.  
In both cases, studies of the effects of these laws are somewhat limited by data 
availability, especially at the level of the firm. Furthermore, in both cases, major 
questions exist about identifying comparable workers, from whom we can infer the 
counterfactual wage and employment levels for affected workers in the absence of these 
laws.   
  A. Cross-city Studies 
Most of the studies of the effects of living wage laws based on evidence across 
cities have been generated by Scott Adams and David Neumark. Their several papers on 
this issue are summarized in Adams and Neumark (2004, 2005), and I draw extensively 
from these papers below.   
  Adams and Neumark use data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS-ORG) for their analyses. The CPS-ORG is a large monthly 
survey of about 50,000 households, used by the federal government to calculate monthly 
employment rates. Since participating households stay in the sample for four months in 
  11each of two different time periods (separated by eight months), the ORG sample limits 
the sample to include only those answering the survey for the last time, thus ensuring 
they will appear in any statistical analysis only once.  
  Using CPS-ORG data for the period 1996-2002, Adams and Neumark have 
estimated regression equations in which the wages, employment levels, and poverty 
status of individuals are associated with whether or not their city has a minimum wage 
law, controlling for many other characteristics of the individuals and where they live. The 
details of this estimation are provided in the Appendix below.  
  Generally, the Adams-Neumark papers show the following: 
•  Wages of low-wage workers are modestly higher in cities that have passed living 
wage ordinances than in those that have not; 
•  Employment levels of these workers are modestly lower in these cities; and 
•  Poverty rates are lower there as well. 
The magnitudes of these estimated effects often differ quite substantially between 
those in the bottom decile of workers and those between the 10
th and 50
th percentiles. 
Furthermore, the estimated effects also differ between laws covering contractors v. those 
covering firms obtaining financial assistance, and also vary according to the lag imposed 
on the law’s passage.  
For example, in Adams and Neumark (2005), a 50% increase in any type of 
specified living wage (relative to the minimum wage) appear to raise wages of workers in 
the bottom decile by 2% after a 1-year lag, though this effect is not statistically 
significant (at the .10 level); it raise wages by about 1% for those between the 10
th and 
50
th percentiles, regardless of the lag structure (with a 6-month lag showing the most 
  12significant results). But contractor-only laws generate few significant positive effects on 
wages at all, while those for business assistance laws are more consistently positive and 
significant for both groups.
11  
As for employment effects, Adams and Neumark find that a 50% increase in the 
living wage reduces employment 6% with a one year lag among those in the bottom 
decile of wages; the effect is again largest (nearly 9%) for business assistance laws and 
smallest (and insignificant) for contractor laws. No negative employment effects are 
observed for those in the 10
th-50
th percentiles of the wage distribution. And, regarding 
poverty, Adams and Neumark estimate that a 50% increase in the living wage reduces the 
number of families below the poverty line by 1-2%, with much smaller changes below 
sub-poverty thresholds.    
The last of these findings is quite striking, since it implies that the positive effects 
of living wage ordinances on wages more than offset their negative effects on 
employment, even though the estimated magnitudes of the former are not always greater 
than the latter. This finding is also noteworthy, since it is the opposite of what Neumark 
has found (in his work with William Wascher) on the effects of minimum wage increases 
at the state or federal levels (Neumark and Wascher, 2006).  
Adams and Neumark attribute their findings on poverty to the apparent fact that 
employers in covered firms shift employment away from those in the bottom decile of 
workers and towards those somewhat higher in the wage distribution, whose skills are 
presumably stronger and more likely merit the now-higher wages that are mandated. 
                                                 
11 Specifically, wages rise by about 3% for the lowest decile of workers with a 50% increase in the living 
wage relative to the minimum wage after a one-year lag; and they raise the wages of those in the 10
th-50
th 
percentiles by 1-2% regardless of lag structure.  
  13Indeed, this interpretation is consistent with the changes in the relative employment rates 
of the two groups associated with “living wages” in their studies.  
To bolster this interpretation, Adams and Neumark also show that poor families 
are more likely to include both categories of lower-wage workers; but that those further 
below the poverty threshold contain relatively more workers from the lowest decile of 




12 They argue that those in the latter group are more likely to be 
pushed just over the poverty threshold by living wage laws, while those in the former 
group were and remain further below that threshold.  
Thus, the improvement in poverty rates associated with living wage laws does not 
necessarily imply uniformly positive effects of these laws on labor market outcomes of 
the working poor; rather, their estimates suggest somewhat more negative effects for the 
bottom rung of workers in these cities, whose employment is most reduced by the 
presence of these laws; and more positive effects for those slightly higher (but still well 
below average) in the distribution of workers, who show no negative employment effects 
associated with these laws.  
If correct, this interpretation might also account for why the effects on poverty 
rates of living wage laws appear negative in their work, while those of minimum wage 
laws are more positive. They speculate that living wage laws affect workers high enough 
in the skills distribution to maintain employment, while those affected by minimum wage 
laws are more concentrated among the bottom rung of adults whose employment is more 
negatively affected by either type of law. 
                                                 
12 Of course, very young workers in middle- or upper-income families can also be found in large numbers 
among those in the bottom decile or 10
th-50
th percentiles of the wage distribution.  
  14A few other findings by Adams and Neumark are noteworthy as well. For one 
thing, their results suggest that the impacts of minimum wage laws depend on geographic 
coverage and implementation. Specifically, they show that county-wide living wage laws, 
and those in cities where other nearby cities also have such laws, have the largest positive 
effects on observed wages of workers in the bottom decile. In the case of county-wide 
laws, negative effects on employment are also reduced – consistent with the notion 
mentioned above of more limited competition from other lower-wage firms in these 
situations. The magnitudes of both wage gains and employment losses for these workers 
are also greater (though not always significantly so) when community hiring is specified, 
when these laws are superseded by collective bargaining, when contractor coverage is 
relatively broad, and when enforcement and implementation of the laws are stricter and 
more aggressive.
13 These findings thus confirm the notion that the context and specific 
features of how these laws are designed and implemented have important effects on their 
outcomes.
14   
One troubling aspect of the Adams-Neumark work is that their results, both 
positive and negative, seem too large – especially given the small numbers of workers 
directly affected by these laws. For example, if just 2-3% of workers in the bottom decile 
are directly impacted by these laws, then a 50% increase in the living wage must generate 
more than that amount of wage increase for the affected workers to raise their overall 
wages by 2%, as specified above. Since four times as many workers are found in the 10
th-
50
th percentiles as in the bottom deciles, fewer than 1% of workers in the former category 
should be affected by living wage laws; and yet 50% increases in the living wage raise 
                                                 
13 See Adams and Neumark (2005a, b) for exactly how they define each of these characteristics.  
14 The effects of other design features, such as the handling of health insurance and other benefits, has not 
been studied to date.  
  15wages for this entire category of workers by 1% or more in their estimates. The 
employment declines estimated for those in the bottom decile and noted above (as large 
as 6-9% in some cases) also seem too big, especially relative to the wage increases 
estimated for this group. 
Other criticisms of the Adams and Neumark work can be found in Brenner et al. 
(2002).
15 Specifically, they claim that: 1) Limiting their samples to workers in the bottom 
decile (or even the 10
th-50
th percentiles) generate sample selection biases, especially since 
the dependent variable in the wage regressions are being used to define the samples; 2) 
Subminimum-wage workers are very unlikely to be covered by “living wage” ordinances 
and therefore should not be in the sample; 3) Business assistance laws are often enforced 
very weakly, and cannot really generate the kinds of stronger effects estimated by Adams 
and Neumark; and 4) Coverage of cities in their sample is heavily tilted towards Los 
Angeles along with some other very large cities. Indeed, they argue that the Adams-
Neumark results are quite sensitive to these specification issues.  
In turn, Adams and Neumark (2004) have responded to many of these criticisms, 
especially the ones regarding sample selection bias and the reach of business assistance 
laws. Though I find their arguments more compelling than those of their critics on many 
of these issues, some concerns over sample sizes and representativeness both within and 
across their cities remain. And questions about why some cities implement “living wage” 
ordinances in the first place while others do not – even within a sample of cities in which 
campaigns are attempted – raise concerns about whether treatment and control cities are 
truly comparable in all other dimensions but the living wage measure. 
                                                 
15 Brenner et al. actually focus on an early paper by Neumark alone (2002) in their critique. But most 
features of that paper to which they object have been retained in subsequent analyses by Adams and 
Neumark. 
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B. Studies Within Cities  
      A series of studies has also been done that focus on specific cities in which 
“living wage” ordinances have been implemented. Generally these studies attempt to 
define groups of workers or firms that are relatively comparable to one another, except 
that one group should be affected by the passage of these laws and the other should not 
be. In comparing wage growth across the two groups of workers or firms after the 
passage of the “living wage” ordinance, these studies mostly generate “difference-in-
difference” estimates of the impacts of the ordinances on workers’ wages. Of course, the 
extent to which the “treatment” and “control” groups are really comparable except for the 
treatment, and the extent to which the treatment differentially affects the two groups, are 
open to question in virtually each study. 
  For instance, Reich et al. (2005) have analyzed the extension of San Francisco’s 
living wage law in 1999 to cover workers at San Francisco International Airport. They 
combine data from establishments at the airport, surveys of workers there, and 
administrative data. The study finds strong positive effects on the lowest-paid workers’ 
wages and reductions in inequality across worker groups. The positive effects at the 
bottom of the spectrum generate “ripple” effects on wages above those levels. They also 
find evidence of lower turnover and improved morale among workers. Additional costs to 
employers are estimated to be less than 1 percent of revenue. Finally, they find no 
evidence of reduced employment between 1998 and 2001; indeed, employment at the 
airport rose considerably over this time period.  
  17However, it is noteworthy that this study contained no control group at all. A new 
international terminal was opened at the airport during this time period, and no doubt the 
terminal contributed importantly to rising employment. Absent the extension of the living 
wage law, it is impossible to know what the counterfactual level of employment would 
be, and whether or how much decline there might have been because of that extension. 
Fairris (2005) analyzes the effects of a living wage ordinance in Los Angeles. He 
analyzes data on 75 contractor firms and 210 non-contractors. Controlling for observable 
characteristics of these firms (size, union status, and profits), he finds higher wages for 
low-wage workers, though no change in benefit levels. He also finds reductions in 
turnover and absenteeism, as well as cuts in overtime hours and job training. And he 
finds modest reduction of employment of 1.6% overall at contractor relative to non-
contractor firms, which presumably is concentrated among (and represents an even higher 
percentage of) low-wage worker employment.
16 In another study using these data, Fairris 
and Bujanda (2005) find that newly hired workers after the passage of the ordinance were 
older, more educated, and had already been earning higher wages elsewhere, thus 
offsetting as much as 40 percent of the wage gains generated by the ordinance (in their 
estimates).           
Finally, Brenner (2005) concentrates on the effects of a new living wage law in 
Boston, by analyzing 15 service contractor firms that were affected by the law (because 
they hired low-wage workers) and 51 firms unaffected (because they did not). Like the 
other studies, Brenner finds that wages rose among the least-paid workers and that 
inequality declined at the firms affected by the new law. He finds little effect on turnover 
                                                 
16 Indeed, Adams and Neumark claim that the reduction in employment among low-wage workers is likely 
2-3 times as large in magnitude as the 1.6% figure suggests, since low-wage workers constitute one-third to 
one-half of total employment. 
  18and absenteeism, and he finds a reduction in the fraction of part-time workers. While 
Brenner claims that there was no reduction in employment at the impacted firms, Adams 
and Neumark (2005) point out that employment grew relatively more rapidly (by about 
10%) at the unaffected firms over the same period.  
From these types of studies, it is impossible to infer the broader effects of living 
wage ordinances on the local labor markets in which they occur, and the magnitudes of 
effects on both wages and employment there; for instance, when employment grows less 
rapidly at covered firms, we don’t know whether or where the workers who otherwise 
would have worked at these firms become employed, nor at what wages. But the 
observed reductions in part-time (or over-time) employment and in relative employment 
at these firms in both the Brenner and Fairris papers are consistent with modest 
reductions in labor demand and a reallocation of labor across firms, as emphasized in 
basic economic models of the labor market. Positive effects on turnover and morale are 
additional benefits that likely offset part of the higher costs to employers, but these do not 
necessarily offset those costs entirely. Whether or not the affected employers shift their 
hiring to those with more skills in response to the mandated payments of higher wages, as 
Adams and Neumark suggest, has also not been determined in any of these studies.   
  
IV.  Conclusion 
In this paper I have reviewed the likely effects of “living wage” ordinances on 
employment outcomes, at least according to economic theory; as well as empirical 
evidence on their actual effects. The empirical evidence includes studies across cities that 
have or have not implemented these ordinances, using data from the CPS; as well as 
  19several studies focusing on smaller samples of workers and/or firms within specific cities 
that have passed these ordinances. 
Both types of empirical studies have clear limitations. Yet there is some 
consensus across most of them that wages rise among the least-paid workers, while their 
employment levels modestly decline (at the covered firms and maybe more broadly), as a 
result of these laws. There appears to be some evidence of lower turnover and better 
morale as well, though this might be partly driven by changes in the nature of workers 
hired as a result of the laws. There is also some evidence of reduced training and reduced 
use of part-time or over-time laws on the part of employers, as additional ways of 
offsetting their now-higher labor costs.                                       
The cross-city work of Adams and Neumark has generated the additional finding 
that the implementation of living wage laws might be associated with modest reductions 
in poverty. This stands in sharp contrast to earlier work by Neumark on the effects of 
minimum wage increases. But Adams and Neumark also suggest that the poverty 
reductions are likely driven by improved wage and employment outcomes among 
workers whose wages are below the median but above the bottom decile. In contrast, 
their work suggests that employment declines most for those in the bottom group. 
 Finally, it is clear from all of these studies that any effects of living wage laws – 
both positive and negative – are extremely modest in magnitude, since very few low-
wage workers are actually affected by these laws, and the impacts per worker are quite 
modest. The possibility that living wage ordinances on their own might help build a 
“middle class” is very remote. Indeed, one might apply a version of Henry Kissinger’s 
  20description of academic politics to the study of living wage laws – namely, that the 
politics are so fierce while (or maybe because) the stakes are so very small. 
It is not at all clear how we might expand the scope of “living wage” laws so that 
they might affect more workers. But, even if we knew how to do so, their potential 
negative as well as positive effects might grow in overall magnitude. As such, the 
usefulness of this particular tool as a means of combating growing labor market 
inequality will necessarily be limited. 
This does not mean, in my view, that “living wage” laws shouldn’t be passed. 
Generating some very modest net benefits for workers with below-average wages, 
especially in poor households, is arguably better than generating none at all. In a world 
where few other tools might realistically be available to directly raise the wages of low 
earners, perhaps we should think of “living wage” ordinances as one of the few policy 
tools available in a very imperfect and constrained situation for the advocates of low-
wage workers. And, if other goals motivated these campaigns in some cases – such as 
limiting the outsourcing of municipal work and the use of public money to subsidize 
large companies through “economic development” - perhaps some of these goals have 
been accomplished as well.   
Furthermore, if placed within the context of broader campaigns to improve the 
wages and benefits of less-skilled workers in the private sector, the “living wage” battles 
might play some useful symbolic role and raise awareness of pay disparity issues. 
Expanding collective bargaining, for example, would likely have far greater impacts, and 
perhaps “living wage” campaigns can be part of broader efforts to do so. But “living 
  21wage” campaigns must then be viewed as complements, not substitutes, for these other 
efforts.  
It seems that a few other lessons might be derived from this work. For one thing, 
attempts to address labor market inequality through public mandates alone inevitably 
generate the risks of tradeoffs between wage levels and employment. The possibility of 
tradeoffs does not necessarily imply that these mandates have no role – but only that they 
entail potential costs as well as benefits. This notion is also true of higher minimum 
wages and expanded collective bargaining – especially in a world where new 
technologies, immigration and offshoring present employers with many more options for 
offsetting higher wages than they had in the past. In other words, labor demand has likely 
grown more “elastic” over time – which results both in greater inequality and more 
serious constraints in our efforts to reverse it through government dictates. 
Efforts to reverse wage inequality will likely require a wide range of efforts, 
including much more education and training, and publicly financed benefits (like health 
insurance and parental leave) that do not induce employers to respond to higher labor 
costs with employment reductions. Efforts to support the creation of higher-wage jobs – 
through tax credits for training or job upgrading and technical assistance as well as 
mandates – also need to be part of the equation (Holzer, 2007). Battles to expand “social 
justice” by directly raising the wages of a small group of workers might contribute to 
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  24                                                   Appendix 
  
  Using CPS-ORG data for the period 1996-2002, Adams and Neumark have 
estimated equations of the following form: 
1) Yikt = f( LWkt; Xit; Xkt ) + uikt
where Y represents the log(wage), employment, or poverty status of the individual; LW 
represents the log of the living wage for city k and month/year t (and is set to zero where 
no such wage exists); the X represent certain control variables for characteristics of 
people or their cities/states; u is a residual; and i, k and t denote a person, city or 
month/year respectively.  
  The samples are frequently limited to workers aged 16-70 in the bottom decile of 
workers in each metro area, or sometimes those between the 10
th and 50
th percentiles. 
Personal characteristics for which controls are included are generally age, sex, race, 
education and marital status. Time and city dummies are included to control for average 
local unemployment rates and average wages; state-level statutory minimum wages 
during the relevant period, as well as time trends for cities with and without living wages 
at any point in time, are included as controls as well.  
LW appears either contemporaneously or in lagged form (by six months or 1 
year). Sometimes a single LW variable is used to represent the presence of “living wage” 
laws, while in other cases separate variables are included for cities with provisions 
covering contractors v. firms receiving city assistance.  
Only those cities with at least 25 low-wage workers appearing in the sample in 
any specified month are included in the sample. This condition, along with the fact that 
the CPS only identifies the larger metropolitan areas to start with, implies that the sample 
  25of cities is quite highly skewed towards the largest. Finally, to account for differences in 
unobserved characteristics between cities that choose to implement living wage laws v. 
those that do not, at least one of the Adams-Neumark papers (2003) limits the sample 
only to those cities that have at least tried to pass a living wage law in a local referendum, 
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Employment Effects of Wage Floors 
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Ventura, CA     May 2006  $9.75  $12.50  Y  Y  N  N    
Manchester, CT     April 2006  $11.06  $14.00  N  Y  Y  N    
Miami, FL     April 2006  $10.58  $11.83  Y  Y  N  N    
Albuquerque, NM     April 2006  n/a  $7.50  Y  N  N  N  Final wage level of $7.50 to be phased 
in by 2009. 
Sandia Pueblo, NM     April 2006  n/a  $8.18  Y  Y  Y  Y    
Santa Barbara, CA     March 2006  $12.00  $14.00  N  Y  N  N  Living wage set at $11.00 for 
employers who provide additional 
benefits to employees. 
Washington, DC     January 2006  n/a  $11.75  N  Y  Y  N  Additionally, a citywide minimum 
wage is set at $7.00 per hour or $1.00 
above the federal minimum wage, 
whichever is greater. 
Nassau County, NY     December 2005              n/a $12.50 N Y N N Final wage level of $12.50 to be phased 
in by 2010. 
Albany, NY     September 2005  n/a  $10.25  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Brookline, MA     May 2005  n/a  $10.30  N  Y  N  N    
Syracuse, NY     May 2005  $10.08  $11.91  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index.  Only 
employees working 30 years or more 
are covered. 
Philadelphia, PA     May 2005  n/a  $7.73  Y  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set to 150 percent 
of the higher of federal or state 
minimum wage. 
Eau Claire, WI  *  May 2005  n/a  $5.65  Y  Y  Y  Y  Repealed by state law in June 2005. 
Lacrosse, WI  *  April 2005  n/a  $5.70  Y  Y  Y  Y  Repealed by state law in June 2005. 
Santa Monica, CA     March 2005  n/a  $12.10  N  Y  N  N  Previous living wage ordinance passed 
in 2001, repealed in 2002. 
Bloomington, IN     March 2005  $8.50  $10.00  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Milwaukee, WI  *  February 2005  n/a  $7.98  Y  Y  Y  Y  Repealed by state law in June 2005. Table 1 
Summary of US Living Wage Ordinances 
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Sonoma, CA     July 2004  $11.70  $13.20  Y  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Durham County, NC     June 2004  n/a  $10.34  Y  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 7.5 percent 
above the federal poverty level for a 
family of four. 
Lincoln, NE     March 2004  $9.62  $10.58  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 110 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
Sacramento, CA     December 2003  $9.67  $11.17  Y  Y      N N Living  wage  level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Sebastopol, CA     December 2003  **  $13.20  Y  Y  Y  N  Employers may deduct health-care 
costs from the wage level.  Living wage 
level is indexed to rise with the federal 
cost of living adjustment for the San 
Francisco area. 
Lawrence, KS     October 2003  $11.00  $12.50  N  N  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 130 percent 
of the federal poverty level for a family 
of three. 
Port Hueneme, CA     October 2003  $9.00  $11.50  N  Y  N  N    
Lansing, MI     September 2003  $10.60  $13.25  N  Y  Y  N  Employers may deduct health-care 
costs from the wage level (up to 20 
percent of the wage).  Living wage 
level is set at 125 percent of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
Orlando, FL     August 2003  $8.50  $10.20  Y  Y  N  N    
Lakewood, OH     July 2003  $10.28  $11.39  Y  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. Table 1 
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Dayton, OH     July 2003  $9.30  $11.16  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 120 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
Arlington, VA     June 2003  n/a  $11.20  N  Y  N  N    
Ingham County, MI     June 2003  $10.00  $12.50  Y  Y  N  N  Employers may deduct health-care 
costs from the wage level (up to 20 
percent of the wage).  Living wage 
level is set at 125 percent of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
Prince George's County, 
MD 
   June 2003  n/a  $11.25  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Palm Beach County, FL     February 2003  n/a  $10.39  N  Y  N  N    
Santa Fe, NM     February 2003  n/a  $10.50  Y  Y  Y  Y  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Cincinnati, OH     November 2002  $9.23  $10.80  Y  Y  N  N  Living wage level is adjusted annually 
by the percentage increase in the 
federal poverty guidelines. 
Louisville, KY     November 2002  $11.00  n/a  Y  N  N  N  Health care must be provided on top of 
the living wage.  Living wage level is 
indexed to rise with the federal cost of 
living adjustment. 
Bellingham, WA     November 2002  $10.81  $12.43  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is adjusted annually 
by the percentage change in the 
Implicit Price Deflator. 
Westchester County, NY     November 2002  $11.50  $13.00  N  Y  Y  N    
Taylor, MI     November 2002  $9.67  $12.09  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 125 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. Table 1 
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Broward County, FL     October 2002  $10.15  $11.48  Y  Y  N  N    
Watsonville, CA     September 2002  $12.43  $13.56  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the federal cost of living 
adjustment. 
Fairfax, CA     August 2002  $13.00  $14.75  Y  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Southfield, MI     July 2002  $10.00  $12.50  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 125 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
Oxnard, CA     July 2002  n/a  $12.88  N  Y  N  N    
Montgomery County, 
MD 
   June 2002  n/a  $11.60  N  Y  N  N    
New Orleans, LA     February 2002  n/a  $6.85  Y  Y  Y  Y  Citywide minimum wage is set at $1.00 
above the federal minimum wage. 
Hazel Park, MI  *  February 2002  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Repealed in June 2002. 
Marin County, CA     January 2002  $9.50  $10.75  Y  Y  N  N    
Pima County, AZ     January 2002  $8.60  $9.67  Y  N  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Bozeman, MT     December 2001  $9.00  $10.06  Y  N  Y    N Living  wage  level  is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Santa Cruz County, CA     December 2001             $12.43 $13.56 N Y N N Living  wage  level  is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
New Britain, CT     December 2001  n/a  $10.97  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 118 of the 
federal poverty level for a family of 
four. 
Cumberland County, NJ     December 2001  $10.87  $8.50          N Y N N Employers  who do not provide a 
pension benefit must add a further 
$1.25 to the hourly wage. 
Camden, NJ  *  December 2001  $8.00  $9.50  N        Y N N Repealed  in January 2003. Table 1 
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Burlington, VT     November 2001  $12.02  $13.49  Y  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the state-level cost of living 
adjustment. 
Charlottesville, VA     November 2001  n/a  $9.73  N  Y  N  N    
Richmond, CA     October 2001  $11.42  $12.92  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is adjusted annually 
by the percentage increase in wages 
under citywide employee labor 
agreements. 
Washtenaw County, MI     October 2001  $9.87  $11.58  N  Y  N  N    
Hempstead, NY  *  October 2001  $9.00  $10.25  N  Y  Y  N  Repealed in December 2001. 
Monroe County, MI  *  October 2001  $8.70  $10.20  Y  Y  N  N  Repealed in March 2003. 
Ashland, OR     September 2001  **  $12.43  Y  Y  Y  N  Employers may deduct health-care 
costs and other benefits from the wage 
level.  Living wage level is indexed to 
rise with the consumer price index. 
Oyster Bay, NY     August 2001  $9.00  $10.25  N  Y  N  N  Only employees in janitorial and 
security jobs are covered. 
Gloucester County, NJ     August 2001  $8.50  $10.87  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at the greater 
of $8.50 per hour or the federal poverty 
level. 
Suffolk County, NY     July 2001  $10.02  $11.41  N  Y  Y  N    
Pittsburgh, PA  *  May 2001  $9.12  $10.62  Y  Y  Y  N  Repealed in March 2002. 
Ventura County, CA     May 2001  $9.00  $2.00  N  Y  N  N    
Miami Beach, FL     April 2001  $8.56           $9.81 Y Y N N Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Pittsfield Township, MI     April 2001  $9.88  $11.58  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Eastpointe, MI     March 2001  $10.00  $12.50  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 125 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. Table 1 
Summary of US Living Wage Ordinances 
 
      Living Wage  Coverage    














Min. Wage  Notes 
 
  33
Missoula, MT     March 2001  $9.22  n/a  N  N  Y  N  Living wage level is set to at least 
match the pay of the lowest-paid city 
full-time employee.  Health benefits 
must also be provided. 
Ann Arbor, MI     March 2001  $9.91  $11.48  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is adjusted annually 
by the percentage increase in the 
federal poverty guidelines. 
Ferndale, MI     February 2001  $8.50  $9.75  N  Y  N  N    
Rochester, NY     January 2001  $9.68  $10.81  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Salem, OR  *  January 2001  $9.50  $11.00  Y  N  N  N  Repealed in January 2003. 
Meriden, CT     November 2000  $10.64  **  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 110 percent 
(w/health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four.  If 
health insurance is not provided, the 
employer must pay an additional hourly 
sum determined by the city based on 
average costs of comprehensive health 
insurance in the state. 
Santa Cruz, CA     October 2000  $12.43  $13.56  Y  Y  N  N    
Eau Claire County, WI  *  September 2000  $7.53  $8.29  N  Y  N  N  Repealed by state law in June 2005. 
San Francisco, CA     August 2000  **  $11.03  N  Y  N  N  Covered employers must provide health 
insurance or pay $1.25 per worker per 
hour into the city's public health system 
fund.  Additionally, a citywide 
minimum wage is set at $9.36 per hour 
and is indexed to rise with the 
consumer price index. 
St. Louis, MO     August 2000  $10.31  $13.18  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is defined as a wage 
sufficient to lift a family of three above 
the eligibility level for food stamps. Table 1 
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Berkeley, CA     June 2000  $11.39  $13.28  Y  Y  Y  N  Amended in October 2000 to include 
all employees at the city marina. 
Cleveland, OH     June 2000  n/a  $10.00  N  Y  Y  N  Only employees working at least 30 
hours per week are covered. 
Alexandria, VA     June 2000  n/a  $12.75  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed annually 
to the poverty threshold for a family of 
four in combination with costs for 
health insurance. 
Toledo, OH     June 2000  $10.57  $12.50  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 110 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 130 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
Omaha, NE  *  April 2000  n/a  n/a  Y  Y  Y  N  Repealed in September 2001.  Living 
wage level was set at 100 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 110 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
San Fernando, CA     April 2000  $7.75  $8.82  N  Y  Y  N  Wages are adjusted annually based on 
changes in the state employment 
retirement system. 
Denver, CO     February 2000  n/a  $9.62  N  Y  N  N  Only employees in the following jobs 
are covered: parking lot attendant, 
security guard, clerical support worker, 
childcare worker.  Living wage level is 
set at 100 percent of the federal poverty 
level for a family of four. 
Warren, MI     January 2000  $9.68  $12.09  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 125 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. Table 1 
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Corvallis, OR     November 1999  n/a  $10.47  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Hartford, CT     September 1999  $10.58  $15.39  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 110 percent 
(w/health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
Tucson, AZ     September 1999  $9.17  $10.32  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Buffalo, NY     August 1999  $9.03  $10.15  N  Y  N  N    
Los Angeles County, CA     June 1999  $8.32  $9.46  N  Y  N  N    
Ypsilanti, MI     June 1999  $8.50  $10.00  N  Y  Y  N    
Ypsilanti Township, MI     June 1999  $8.50  $10.00  N  Y  Y  N    
Somerville, MA     May 1999  n/a  $10.51  Y  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
of the federal poverty level for a family 
of four. 
Miami-Dade County, FL     May 1999  $9.81  $11.23  Y  Y  N  N    
Cambridge, MA     May 1999  n/a  $12.19  Y  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Hayward, CA     April 1999  $9.71  $11.20  Y  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the area cost of living adjustment. 
Madison, WI     March 1999  n/a  $10.92  Y  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 110 percent 
of the federal poverty level for a family 
of four. 
Dane County, WI     March 1999  n/a  $9.31  Y  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
of the federal poverty level for a family 
of four. Table 1 
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Hudson County, NJ     January 1999  $7.73  n/a  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 150 percent 
of the federal minimum wage.  Only 
employees in security, food service, 
and janitorial jobs working at least 20 
hours per week are covered.  Health 
benefits must also be provided. 
San Jose, CA     November 1998  $12.20  $13.52  N  Y  Y  N    
Detroit, MI     November 1998  $10.00  $12.50  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
(w/health insurance) or 125 percent 
(w/o health insurance) of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four. 
Multnomah County, OR     October 1998  **  $10.63  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index.  Only 
employees in security, food service, 
and janitorial jobs are covered.  
Mandated wage level is the hourly 
value of the wage and benefits package 
paid to the employee. 
Pasadena, CA     September 1998  $9.16  $10.73  Y  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Cook County, IL     September 1998  $9.43  $11.78  N  Y  N  N    
Chicago, IL     July 1998  n/a  $10.33  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 100 percent 
of the federal poverty level for a family 
of four. 
San Antonio, TX     July 1998  n/a  $9.62  N  N  Y  N  Covered employers must also pay at 
least 70 percent of their workers a 
higher wage ($11.14 for services 
involving durable goods and $10.86 for 
services involving non-durable goods). Table 1 
Summary of US Living Wage Ordinances 
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Oakland, CA     March 1998  $10.07  $11.58  N  Y  Y  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index. 
Durham, NC     January 1998  n/a  $9.51  Y  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 105 percent 
of the federal poverty level. 
West Hollywood, CA     October 1997  $8.67  $9.92  N  Y  Y  N    
Boston, MA     September 1997  n/a  $11.95  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set to the higher of 
100 percent of the federal poverty level 
for a family of four or 110 percent of 
the state minimum wage. 
Duluth, MN     July 1997  $7.61  $8.49  N  N  Y  N  Living wage ordinance mandates that 
covered employers pay at least 90 
percent of their employees the living 
wage. 
Milwaukee County, WI     May 1997  n/a  $7.88  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is indexed to rise 
with the consumer price index.  Only 
employees in janitorial, security, and 
parking lot attendant jobs are covered. 
New Haven, CT     April 1997  n/a  $11.50  N  Y  N  N  Living wage level is set at 120 percent 
of the federal poverty level for a family 
of four. 
Los Angeles, CA     March 1997  $9.39  $10.64  N  Y  Y  N  Wages are adjusted annually based on 
changes in the benefits paid to the 
members of the city employees 
retirement system. 
Minneapolis, MN     March 1997  n/a  $10.57  N  N  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 110 percent 
of the federal poverty level for a family 
of four. 
St. Paul, MN     January 1997  n/a  $10.57  N  N  Y  N  Living wage level is set at 110 percent 
of the federal poverty level for a family 
of four. 
New York City, NY     September 1996  $10.00  $11.10  N  Y  N  N    Table 1 
Summary of US Living Wage Ordinances 
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        Jersey City, NJ     June 1996  $7.50  n/a  N Y N N Only  employees in clerical, food 
service, janitorial, and security jobs are 
covered.  Health and vacation benefits 
must also be provided. 
Portland, OR     June 1996  $8.91  $10.57  N  Y  N  N  Only employees in temporary 
janitorial, parking lot attendant, 
clerical, and security jobs are covered. 
Santa Clara County, CA     October 1995  $10.00  n/a  N  N  Y  N  Covered employers must provide health 
insurance or a suitable alternative to 
permanent employees. 
Baltimore, MD     December 1994  n/a  $9.30  N  Y  N  N    
Gary, IN     January 1991  **  n/a  N  N  Y  N  Covered employers must pay a 
prevailing wage and provide a 
complete health care package to 
employees working over 25 hours per 
week. 
Des Moines, IA     January 1988  $9.00  n/a  N  Y  N  N  Living wage ordinance covers urban 
renewal projects and mandates an 
average wage of $9.00 with benefits. 
 
 
* = Ordinance has been repealed.  ** = See notes for more information.  n/a = Not available. 
 
Sources: The Living Wage Resource Center; web sites of respective jurisdictions. 
 